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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LABELS-BASTARDY
AS A CASE IN POINT
Robert J. Wysong*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bastardy proceedings' result, potentially, in a support order -2
compelling a putative father to pay a fixed sum3 for the upbring-
ing of his bastard child. These proceedings, however, result also
in community stigma following judicial acknowledgment that the
parents have engaged in distinctly unsocial conduct. They have
committed fornication and have imposed their impropriety upon
an innocent child.4
* B.A.,1956; LL.B., 1959, Rutgers University; Teaching-Research Asso-
ciate, College of Law, University of Nebraska, 1959-60.
1 See 7 Am. Jur., Bastards § 4 (1937) where various euphemisms are
suggested substitutes for the unpleasant implications of "bastard."
These substitutes are "child born out of wedlock" or "illegitimate."
The present study will use all three terms. Also, the terms "bastardy,"
"filiation" and "paternity" proceedings will be used interchangeably.
2 UNIFORM ILLEGITIMACY ACT § 22 (1922).
3 Often the "fixed sum" amounts to $15,000 or more before the child
becomes 16 or an age at which the child is considered capable of
self-support. Schatkin, The Scandal of Our Paternity Courts, The
Reader's Digest, May 1960, p. 71. In addition, the father is most fre-
quently liable for the expenses connected with the pregnancy and
childbirth. See e.g., State ex rel. Raydel v. Raible, 117 N.E.2d 480
(Ohio App. 1954). In the usual case the court has no statutory
criteria for determining the amount of support for the child. The
only criteria available are the "child's welfare" or the "best interests
of the state". Thus, support orders often are issued "as shall to the
court seem best". Fuller v. United States, 65 A.2d 589 (D.C.Mun. App.
1949).
4 See State v. Taylor, 39 Wash.2d 751, 238 P.2d 1189 (1951) (dictum)
where the nature of the subject now under inquiry is well discussed
by the court. The decision affirmed a finding of the trial court that
the defendant was the putative father of the prosecuting witness'
unborn child. The following remarks are included because it will
be contended in this study that the severely emotional issues involved
in bastardy proceedings provide a significant clue to desirable judicial
procedure. The court said at 752, 238 P.2d at 1189-90:
This is a bastardy proceeding under Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1970
et seq. The word "bastardy" is not a pretty one. While the
meaning it usually connotes is a bit jarring, to say the least,
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In paternity actions the courts in most cases do not punish the
father for his misconduct, but impose upon him the duty to support
his child so that society may be relieved of that responsibility.G The
procedure generally employed for these purposes is summary:
sworn complaint of the mother naming the alleged father, issuance
of a warrant for his arrest, bodily apprehension by a sheriff, pre-
liminary hearing, requirement of recognizance or jail until trial,
and threat of prison upon the failure to fulfill the terms of the
support order.6
Because of the stringencies7 connected with bastardy proced-
the word, when given a fuller or expanded import, even then
hardly denotes the emotions, the conduct, and the human fac-
tors jam-packed and brimming in the muddled human-rela-
tions situation it describes. All individuals are entitled to
their legal rights and their day in court. But it would seem
that legally trained minds could normally find a solution to
the problems involved in bastardy proceedings short of a full-
fledged public airing in court of the often sensational and
sometimes pornographic details, which details, even consider-
ing the mores of our times, most often can hardly be said to
be complimentary to the parties concerned or in the best in-
terests of society. Admittedly, such situations are difficult
and delicate in the extreme, with at least some feelings usually
at fever pitch and emotions all over the place, and with the
principal litigants usually litigious minded in no small degree.
This case presents an outstanding example of an unnces-
sary public airing of the -lurid details of the sex conduct of
two adolescents-not so strangely, or incidentally, a male and
a female. While the matter might have been settled out of
court with credit to all counsel concerned, the trial judge de-
serves credit for limiting the "trial by battle" and the ac-
tivities of the "champions" of the litigants within those bound-
aries permitted to him by law. The ambit of those boundaries,
of course, might have been more narrowly defined by gen-
erally accepted ethical and moral considerations, by greater
emphasis upon and observance of such considerations by the
litigants and their families.
5 State ex rel. Gill v. Volz, 156 Ohio St. 60, 100 N.E.2d 203 (1951),
25 TEMP. L. Q. 364 (1952).
6 UNIFORM ILLEGITIMACY ACT §§ 8-30 (1922). A civil action in-
volving none of these summary procedures is alternately available
in many states. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-111 (1954). In
many cases the summary procedure can be instituted either by the
state or by the mother. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-113 (Supp.1960).
Nebraska does not require a probable cause finding at the preliminary
hearing in order to bind the defendant over for trial. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 13-114 (1954).
7 Problems of support in the entire matrimonial area commonly involve
statutes authorizing the summary disposition of the defendant. See,
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
ures the courts disagree as to the exact nature of the proceeding.8
Most courts label the proceeding "civil."9  Others label bastardy
proceedings "criminal."' 0 Still others call the action "statutory"
or "quasi criminal."" What follows now are examples of eviden-
tiary and procedural questions judicially resolved under either
criminal or civil law through the magic of labels at the sacrifice
of thought. 1
2
HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 422-568 passim (1952).
Usually both criminal and civil actions are available for purposes of
compelling matrimonial support. In the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9C U.L.A. § 15 (1952), the
Commissioners' Note under the section dealing with "Jurisdiction by
Arrest" describes the need for summary procedures such as arrest:
"Section 15 is new. 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'
When the defendant is served with process he is apt to flee to an-
other state instead of awaiting trial."
s See 7 Am. Jur., Bastards § 81 (1937); Schatkin, Should Paternity
Cases be Tried in a Civil or Criminal Court, 1 CRIM. L. REV. (N.Y.)
18 (1954).
9 E.g., People v. Vaughn, 235 II. App. 308, 313 (1925):
It is well settled by the decisions of this State that a
prosecution under the Bastardy Act, though criminal in form,
is a civil action, and is not for the purpose of imposing a pen-
alty upon the putative father for an immoral act, but merely
to compel him to contribute to the support of his illegitimate
child.
20 E.g., State v. Brewer, 38 S.C. 263, 16 S.E. 1001 (1893).
11 E.g., State v. Rowe, 99 Fla. 972, 974, 128 So. 7, 8 (1930):
This court has repeatedly held that proceedings in bas-
tardy, though quasi-criminal in their inception, become civil
when they reach the Circuit Court, and, being statutory, they
must be conducted in substantial requirement with the statute
providing for them.
12 It is not suggested that bastardy proceedings alone raise the basic
question whether criminal or civil law should be invoked. There
are other branches of the law inviting similar inquiry. See, e.g.,
Comment, 5 VILL. L. REV. 107, 113 (1959) (whether juvenile courts
are criminal in nature); Comment, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1001-02
(1956) (juvenile delinquency as a crime); Annot., 100 L. Ed. 156
(1956) (exaction of federal tax penalties as a criminal proceeding);
Comment, 1 VAND. L. REV. 262 (1947) (violation of a municipal
ordinance as a crime).
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II. INITIATING PROCEEDINGS AND ESTABLISHING
JURISDICTION
Rozgal v. Dorrance13 described part of the Nebraska pro-
cedure for initiating bastardy proceedings. Included within this
description was the holding that a finding of probable cause was
not essential in a preliminary hearing prior to binding defendant
over for trial.14 Reasoning: no probable cause is required in non-
criminal proceedings.
Georgia requires the putative father to give bond for the main-
tenance of his illegitimate child until it reaches the age of 14
years.15 If he refuses to give bond he is subject to criminal prose-
cution, and is fined upon conviction. 6
A recent Connecticut case17 sets forth part of the preliminary
procedure prescribed in that state:
Under our procedure, the defendant is accorded a preliminary
hearing. If probable cause is found, he is bound over under bond
13 147 Neb. 260, 268, 23 N.W.2d 85, 90-91 (1946):
The preliminary proceedings before a justice or judge are
in no sense a trial of the merits. His duties as examining
magistrate are for the most part ministerial. He may receive
the complaint, docket the case, issue his warrant, and cause
the arrest of the accused who is forthwith brought before him
to answer the complaint. Unless the party charged then pays
or secures to be paid complainant such sum of money or prop-
erty as complainant may agree to receive in full satisfaction
and shall further give bond to the county board in which such
complainant resides, conditioned to save such county from all
charges toward the maintenance of the child, it is mandatory
that the justice or judge by order bind the accused in a recog-
nizance with sufficient security to appear at the next term of
the district court to answer the complaint and abide the order
of the court thereon, or upon failure by defendant to find such
security to cause the accused to be committed to the county
jail, there to be held to answer such complaint in the district
court.
See Holmes v. Clegg, 131 W.Va. 449, 48 S.E.2d 438 (1948).
'4 Rozgall v. Dorrance, 147 Neb. 260, 269, 23 N.W.2d 85, 91 (1946):
It is elementary that one charged with a felony is entitled
to a preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause. And
such a hearing and finding are jurisdictional only where such
a statutory crime has been charged. A preliminary hearing
with a finding of probable cause is not necessary or required
in a filiation proceeding because it does not come within that
category.
15 See Washington v. Martin, 75 Ga. App. 466, 43 S.E.2d 590 (1947).
16 Ibid. The fine is used for the maintenance of the child.
17 Pelak v. Karpa, 146 Conn. 370, 151 A.2d 333, 335 (1959).
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to await trial. If probable cause is not found, and the plaintiff
appeals, the defendant is also placed under bond. (§ 52-435).
The arrest aspect of paternity actions is recognized as an ex-
traordinary remedy in an essentially civil action simply for the
purpose of enforcing a judgment rendered in the case.1 8 Thus
it has been held 0 that the arrest mechanism does not confer juris-
diction on the court and that a defendant who escapes from jail
and is not present at trial does not deprive the court of its juris-
diction over an adjudication of the defendant's paternity.
The question of jurisdiction also arises when filiation pro-
ceedings are considered civil in the state where the illegitimate
child is conceived and when criminal enforcement is attempted
in a different state. A Massachusetts court reversed2 ° a convic-
tion on a charge of begetting an illegitimate because the begetting
occurred in Rhode Island and is a civil offense there. The court
reasoned that Massachusetts had no power to enforce its laws
relative to acts committed in another sovereignty.
21
18 Ibid.
19 In re Application of Walker, 61 Neb. 803, 808-09, 86 N.W. 510, 511-12
(1901):
The process by which the court acquired jurisdiction on
the defendant was the warrant issued for his arrest, and its
execution serves the same office as the service of a summons
in an ordinary civil action; and the court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant .... The action
being civil in character, there would seem to be no pressing
necessity for the defendant's presence if he voluntarily ab-
sents himself from the court at the time of the hearing had
in that tribunal. The object of the statute providing for the
detention of the defendant in confinement, or his recognizance
for his appearance in the district court, is manifestly for the
purpose of enforcing summarily the judgment rendered in
the action, and not to confer jurisdiction on the court....
20 Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 326 Mass. 559, 95 N.E.2d 925 (1950).
21 Ibid; see Note, The Status of Illegitimates in New England, 38 B. U. L.
REV. 299, 307 (1958):
In Massachusetts . . . the act of begetting an illegitimate
child is a misdemeanor. Prior to 1913 the bastardy proceed-
ing in Massachusetts was by statute a civil action having as
its main purpose the assistance of the mother in the main-
tenance of her child. Today in order for the court to have
jurisdiction, the act of begetting the child must occur within
the state. In addition to the bastardy proceeding, Massachu-
setts has a criminal action for nonsupport. If the question of
the paternity of the illegitimate child has not been adjudicated
under the Bastardy Act, the paternity of the child will be de-
termined under this section.
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Related to the question of jurisdiction is the determination
whether bastardy actions are transitory. Where the purpose of
the bastardy statute is merely to save the public from the expense
of caring for the child the action is not considered transitory.2:
Conversely it has been held that where the statute converts into
a legal duty the father's moral duty to support his illegitimate child
a nonresident mother and child may institute a paternity proceed-
ing.23 It is impossible to understand how the courts determine
when a paternity statute purports merely to aid the public or the
child, or both.
In Connecticut it has been held 24 that a nonresident mother
can maintain an action for support of an illegitimate child against
even a nonresident father to the extent that he has assets in the
state. The court was fearful that Connecticut otherwise would
become a refuge for fathers seeking to avoid assisting in the sup-
port of their illegitimate children. 25
New Jersey, however, does not give relief to a mother bring-
ing an action on a foreign bastardy statute. In Kowalski v.
Wojtkowski2 6 a mother had conceived twins while she was mar-
ried to a man who was not their father. The mother was a dom-
iciliary of Florida where the twins are considered legitimate be-
cause they were conceived in lawful wedlock. The mother, how-
ever, gave birth to them shortly after her husband divorced her.
She then brought 27 a bastardy action in New Jersey against her
adulterer who was the father of the children. The court said:2 s
Whether the [bastardy] proceeding be deemed civil or crim-
inal in nature, or one having the characteristics of both, the gen-
erally accepted rule is that no action is maintainable on a for-
eign bastardy statute. Such is ordinarily an exercise of the police
power to denounce misconduct or to shift the burden of support
from society to the child's natural parent .... Cases of this class
are within the general rule that there cannot be extraterritorial
enforcement of a right created by the law of a foreign state as a
means of furthering its own governmental interests, of which a
statute placing the burden of maintenance of a potential pauper
on an individual to the relief of the public, is also an example.
22 Moore v. State ex rel. Vernon, 47 Kan. 772, 28 Pac. 1072 (1892)-
23 Dicks v. United States, 72 A.2d 34 (D.C. Mun. App. 1950).
24 Pelak v. Karpa, 146 Conn. 370, 151 A.2d 333 (1959).
25 Id. 151 A.2d at 335.
26 19 N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 6 (1955).
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 252-53, 116 A.2d at 9.
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The court concluded: 29
New Jersey's interest in the support of children within its
borders cannot be made to override the status of legitimacy ac-
corded children born in lawful wedlock by laws of the domicile
of origin.
A dissent 30 by Justice William J. Brennan concluded that New
Jersey had a sufficient interest in the welfare of these children
so that it could compel the resident father to support his illegiti-
mate children even when born of his adultery with a married
woman in Florida. Also pertinent here, it might be added, is the
risk that New Jersey might become the sanctuary of errant fathers
evading the duty of support to their illegitimate progeny.
Included in the scope of bastardy jurisdiction is the problem
of venue and the selection of either a criminal or civil court in
which to try the case. Regardless of the label (criminal- civil)
attached to bastardy proceedings, the courts generally hold that the
defendant may not demand a change in venue as he might do in
an ordinary civil case.3 1 The rule as to choice of criminal or civil
courts, however, is not quite so fixed.
Yeager v. People32 clarified for a Colorado trial court whether
it was a criminal or civil court. An unwed mother swore a com-
plaint; the alleged father was arrested, arraigned and subjected
to bond; the case was set over for hearing in the trial court. Three
months later the district attorney filed a criminal information
against the putative father and accused him not only of being the
father, but also of violating the peace and dignity of the State
of Colorado. At the trial, after all evidence was introduced, the
court announced that the case was brought in the name of the
People ex tel. the mother. The Colorado Supreme Court held33
that the trial court was both late and inaccurate in its announce-
ment. Not until just prior to instructing the jury did the trial
court say anything to indicate that the case was other than as
appeared from the criminal information, namely the People against
the defendant. Further, the action was brought not on the rela-
tion of the mother but exclusively in the name of the People. The
29 Id. at 262, 116 A.2d at 14.
3') Id. at 269, 116 A.2d at 19 (dissenting opinion).
31 Francken v. State ex Tel. Fuerst, 190 Wis. 424, 209 N.W. 766 (1926);
State ex Tel. Simon v. District Court, 138 Minn. 77, 163 N.W. 797
(1917).
32 116 Colo. 379, 181 P.2d 442 (1947).
33 Id. at 386, 181 P.2d at 446.
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LABELS
sole plaintiff was identified by an examination of the pleadings,
and only one had been filed, namely, the criminal information.
Lastly, the court held3 4 that the Colorado bastardy statute con-
templates merely a civil action without the intervention of the
district attorney or the inclusion of the name of the People as plain-
tiff. The judgment of the trial court was reversed because "the
procedure followed in the district court was so impregnated with
damaging [criminal] implications that throughout the trial plain-
tiff in error was handicapped to his material prejudice." 35
Choice of a proper court was also the question in In re El,33
a New Jersey decision. The courts involved in the choice were
either the juvenile or civil court. The issue in the El case was
whether a youth under eighteen years of age, who had been ad-judged the father in a filiation proceeding, is guilty of juvenile
delinquency.37 Delinquency is criminal conduct committed by a
youth. Thus the court was asked to determine whether bastardy
was criminal conduct requiring the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The opinion stated: 3S
In Dally v. Overseers of Woodbridge, 21 N.J.L. 491, the ques-
tion was whether character evidence, admissible only in a criminal
case, was proper under a charge of bastardy. Such evidence had
been excluded at the trial on the ground that it is allowable only
in a criminal case. The Supreme Court reversed and declared
the case to be "not strictly civil" so as to exclude character testi-
mony .... So, there is nothing to be gained by attempts at clas-
sification ....
Now what are some of the things by which a bastardy pro-
ceeding may be said "to partake of a criminal action"? They are
readily multiplied. To begin with, the bastardy law provides for
suit in the criminal court of the city or other municipality and for
appeals to the Quarter Sessions by trial de novo with a jury.
... Its initial process is a warrant of arrest executed by a police
officer .... For the release of the accused pending trial bail is
34 Ibid.
35 The court declared that it was error for the trial judge to have in-
structed the jury that defendant's conviction would constitute an
offense against the peace and good order of society. Id. at 387, 181
P.2d at 446.
36 26 N.J. Misc. 285, 60 A.2d 893 (Hudson Co. Ct. Quart. Sess. 1948).
37 The statutory definition of juvenile delinquency is "any act .. .par-
taking of the nature of a criminal action or proceeding when com-
mitted by one under eighteen years of age." N.J. REV. STAT. 2A:
4-14 (Supp.1959).
38 In re El, 26 N.J. Misc. 285, 287, 60 A.2d 893, 895 (Hudson Co. Ct.
Quart. Sess. 1948).
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required.... In default of surety, commitment may be to the
common jail of the county . . . and there are the like provisions
in the event of conviction and default of performance bond for
the commitment of the accused. Nothing more than this sequence
of penal features in a bastardy case should be required to show a
"method partaking of the nature of a criminal action or proceed-
ing."
The court decided 39 that bastardy actions were sufficiently
criminal in procedure to require that the offense be tried in the
juvenile court. However, the holding would have been more de-
fensible if it had been based on the simple recognition that a
conviction of illicit juvenile paternity involves grave social and
financial consequences. This recognition logically would imply
that the court is conscious of the protection and assistance which
juvenile courts are created to provide for a youth faced with such
consequences. A stubborn judicial reliance on the nomenclature
of "civil" or "criminal" may result in decisions which, unlike the
El case, do not accord with the important values suggested by
the facts.
III. PLEADINGS
Special problems arise at the pleading stage of litigation in
a paternity case. It has already been noted4" that choice of a
proper plaintiff to be identified in the initial papers is often diffi-
cult. In New Jersey, for example, the court requires the mother's
name to be substituted for the name of the State as plaintiff4' on
the ground that the proceeding is civil and therefore the State
was not a proper party.
In the District of Columbia principles of criminal law were
the basis for reversing a trial court's denial of an alleged father's
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.4 2 The appellate court recog-
nized that the consequences of a bastardy proceeding were serious
enough to require the application of criminal jurisprudence.43
These consequences involved payments for sixteen years to sup-
port the child and the risk of a one year jail sentence in the event
of default. The court was nevertheless fully conscious of the con-
39 Id. (Emphasis added.)
40 See text at note 32 supra.
41 State v. Arbus, 54 N.J.Super. 76, 148 A.2d 184 (App. Div. 1959).
42 Coleman v. District of Columbia, 83 A.2d 873 (D.C.Mun. App. 1951).
43 The reason back of the defendant's guilty plea most probably was
his inability to estimate the seriousness of the consequences attend-
ant upon a paternity adjudication.
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ventional symbols attached to an examination of what makes a
proceeding "criminal". It sought these symbols without success: 44
The bastardy proceeding is instituted to establish the pa-
ternity and provide for the support of a child born out of wed-
lock. No accusation of crime is made and no punishment is
sought. Although the statute provides that the "prosecution"
shall be upon information in the name of the District, it does not
use the terms guilt or guilty of conviction or sentence; we have
used the term "plea of guilty" because that expression is used in
the statement of proceedings and evidence before us....
The court, despite building this pyramid of labels suggesting
that the criminal law does not apply, made the point that only
criminal law would make sense in a proceeding where the defend-
ant risked punishment in the form of supporting a bastard or go-
ing to jail. Implicit in this thinking is the idea that defendants
convicted of bastardy suffer consequences which most people as-
sociate with punishment even though the State has no intent to
impose punishment.
The statute of limitations is another problem often related
to the pleading stage of litigation.45 A South Dakota decision illus-
trates the limitations problem in a paternity case. The court re-
fused46 to apply the criminal statute of limitations on the ground
that bastardy is a civil action: 47
It is true that the method of procedure partakes, especially
in connection with the inception of the action, very much of the
nature of proceeding in a criminal action. This is not because
the action is in any sense criminal in its nature, but rather be-
cause, from the very necessity of the situation, it is necessary to
secure the person of the defendant and compel the giving of se-
curity in order to insure the value of any judgment that may
eventually be found against the defendant. The proceedings un-
der our statute are, outside of the original arrest, no more criminal
in their nature than are those under our statute providing for
arrest and bail in a civil action.
The defendant adjudged an illegitimate father risks jail.48 Also
he bears the community brand of "sex criminal".49 Yet the court
44 Coleman v. District of Columbia, 83 A.2d 873 (D.C.Mun. App. 1951).
45 See Atkinson, Re-examination of the Procedural Aspects of the Stat-
ute of Limitations, 16 OHIO ST. L. J. 157 (1955).
46 State ex rel. Patterson v. Pickering, 29 S.D. 207, 136 N.W. 105 (1912).
47 Id. at 213-14, 136 N.W. at 106.
48 S.D. CODE § 37:2125 (1939).
49 Presumably the same conduct is socially tolerable when there is no
issue and defendant's indiscretion remains intangible. See Schatkin,
The Scandal of Our Paternity Courts, The Reader's Digest, May 1960,
p. 72.
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perceives nothing criminal in the nature of a bastardy conviction.
The court's reasoning may be analogous to an examination of a
porpoise. A porpoise has the general appearance of a fish. It
swims like a fish and like most fish, it inhabits the ocean. There-
fore, under this remarkable theory a porpoise is a fish. This rea-
soning adds the sum of the characteristics or attributes of an ob-
ject and proceeds to classify that object. Absent is the penetrat-
ing inquiry requiring answers to questions concerning purpose,
function, significant behavior and prime consequences.
Because a porpoise suckles its young, takes its oxygen from
the air and is warm-blooded like other mammals its nature is
more like a mammal than a fish. Thus by analogy, because the
father of an illegitimate child suffers the social stigma imposed
upon the commission of a crime bastardy is more criminal than
civil. It is the State which exhibits the public's interest in the
father's conviction. It is the public which reacts in outrage against
the defendant's callousness to the mother and his indifference to
the child. Nevertheless, these considerations are not key-numbered
in the digest systems and accordingly play little part in judicial
analysis. The South Dakota court saw merely the arrest proced-
ure as a possible indication of the criminal nature of the action
and thus labeled paternity proceedings "civil."
The problem posed by the South Dakota decision raises the
question whether a criminal statute of limitations makes better
sense than a corresponding civil statute in bastardy cases. Although
the civil statute is more frequently applied, the criminal statute
generally gives more protection to defendants.50 The reason back
of this greater protection owes is origin to basic, historical, con-
stitutional mandates 1 which suggest that the State does not have
as great a litigious interest as a civil plaintiff against a given
defendant.
Of probable relevance here, moreover, is the theory that a
civil defendant may be required to redress a wrong only against
an individual; a criminal defendant upon conviction submits to
punishment exacted by all individuals in the society.5 2 For rea-
sons already suggested the bastardy defendant should enjoy the
same safeguards as any other non-capital criminal defendant.53
50 See 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 64 (12th ed. 1955).
51 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VIII.
52 GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW 8-9 (1911).
[i See Lane, Statutes of Limitation in Criminal Law, 16 OHIO ST. L. J.
219, 225-26 (1955).
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As a result, the criminal statute of limitations should be applicable
to bastardy cases but not because of the conventional objectives
underlying the statute.5 4  Bastardy claims do not grow "stale"
more rapidly than most civil claims. Neither does evidence in
bastardy cases "fade in the memory of witnesses" more rapidly.
On .the contrary, as the illegitimate matures it may take on some
of the father's physical features, as children often do, relating it
to the defendant. Therefore, the applicability of the criminal stat-
ute of limitations to paternity actions must be rooted in the greater
protection traditionally accorded criminal defendants confronted
with the power of the State.
IV. EVIDENCE
Questions about corroboration, admissibility of an alibi and
the degree of proof required in paternity actions help demonstrate
the confusion in the courts over the amount of protection which
the alleged father deserves. Sidney B. Schatkin has been closely
associated with the study of paternity proceedings in New York"
and has pointed up the dangers encountered by the bastardy de-
fendant. Schatkin says 6 that innocent defendants are often vic-
tims of extortion or shakedowns by women seeking a respectable
or wealthy father for their illegitimate children.
To implement the protection of the innocent defendant it has
been held57 that the character and quality of proof of corrobora-
tion is the same in filiation proceedings as in criminal cases such
as rape or assault with intent to commit rape where corroboration
of the testimony of the prosecutrix is also required. Although
civil in nature bastardy cases are often treated by the legislature
as if they were criminal. In this manner, corroboration is statu-
torily established to protect innocent persons wrongfully accused.5
On the other hand, it has been held5 9 that the general rule re-
quires no corroboration in civil cases. Accordingly, no corrobora-
54 See Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L. J.
130 (1955).
55 See SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS (3rd ed.
1953).
56 Schatkin, Should Paternity Cases Be Tried in a Civil or Criminal
Court?, 1 CRIM. L. REV. (N.Y.) 18, 22-24, 26-27 (1954).
57 Lockman v. Fulton, 162 Neb. 439, 76 N.W.2d 452 (1956).
58 NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-112 (1954).
59 McGuire v. State, 84 Ariz. 242, 326 P.2d 362 (1958); Roberts v. State,
205 Okla. 632, 240 P.2d 104 (1951).
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tion of the testimony of the child's mother as to the defendant's
paternity is necessary.
It would seem superfluous to develop the point that innocent
men are too easily victimized by mothers in need of a father for
their child. It has been suggested,60 however, that husbandless
women in their maternal crisis should receive every aid at trial
to convict the irresponsible men who customarily flee from
their family obligation. This suggestion is endorsed by local gov-
ernment"' which must often pay for the care of the child when
a father is. not found. The fallacy is that the greater the need
for a conviction, the more easily should a defendant be found
guilty. This fallacy fortunately may be countered by the tradition
which provides for greater certainty of the criminal defendant's
guilt because of the graver consequences attached to a conviction.
62
The consequences of a bastardy proceeding also have puzzled
courts when confronted with the degree of proof required to es-
tablish a prima facie case. Wisconsin has long held that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is essential even though bastardy is
civil.0 3 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently applied64
a statute changing the burden of proof in paternity cases from
evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "clear and satisfactory."
The court held 65 that this statutory change does not violate the
rule against ex post facto laws merely because it applies to pend-
ing proceedings. The court reasoned that ex post facto applies
to criminal laws, while bastardy actions are civil because the father
is neither tried nor punished for any crime.
The decision illustrates two critical problems connected with
paternity cases:
1. The statutory change in degree of proof required in these
cases reflects legislative uncertainty and concern over the
unusual trial difficulties faced by both alleged father and
complaining mother.
2. The inapplicability of the ex post facto principle because
bastardy is not strictly "criminal" displays the judicial tend-
60 See HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 125-26 (1952).
61 See Id. at 120.
02 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VIII.
63 Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952).
04 State v. Brittich, 7 Wis.2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959).
00 Ibid.
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ency to "package" the defendant's rights and to reach con-
clusions based on labels.
The court itself articulated its confusion:t 3
[At] one time it was held that such a proceeding could be
brought before the supreme court for review by writ of error only
and that the accused must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt .... In State ex rel. Mohnke v. Koblitz, 1935, 217 Wis.
231, 258 N.W. 840, this court pointed out that the hybrid
characteristics of the proceeding had created confusion and
difficulty and in some respects the proceeding was governed
by procedural rules more favorable than those applicable in civil
actions. However, these criminal procedural rules did not make
the proceeding a criminal action and the term quasi criminal ap-
plied to a paternity proceeding was misleading unless considered
merely descriptive of the procedure. The court then stated that
the code which defined civil and criminal actions made a paternity
proceeding a civil action .... [The] judgment sought rather
than the procedure applicable therein afforded the basis for de-
termining the nature thereof....
The courts span the proof spectrum in moulding bastardy pro-
cedure and use labels freely in the process. For example it has
been held 67 that an alibi is an admissible defense in a bastardy pro-
ceeding because of the "quasi criminal" nature of the action.
Rooted in the same reasoning is the idea that a more liberal view
concerning what constitutes reversible error can be applied in
bastardy cases.68
V. BASTARDY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Constitutional questions hinge with little complication on the
determination whether paternity proceedings are civil or crim-
inal. Thus the contention that a bastardy support order of $360
per year for ten years is cruel and unusual punishment was re-
jected6 9 on the ground that such support merely relieves the
county of a burden and is not intended to punish the father.
Also it has been held70 that the liability of a father to support
his bastard child is not a debt. Therefore, imprisonment for failure
to provide this support could not be imprisonment for debt in
06 Id. 96 N.W.2d at 340; see also State ex rel. Woolems v. Davis, 178
Ark. 692, 11 S.W.2d 479 (1928).
67 Bolich v. Robinson, 106 Neb. 449, 184 N.W. 218 (1921).
68 Keel v. State, 160 Ala. 476, 49 So.2d 320 (App. 1950).
69 Waters v. Riley, 87 W.Va. 250, 104 S.E. 559 (1920).
70 Acker v. Adamson, 67 S.D. 341, 293 N.W. 83 (1940).
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violation of the Constitution.71 The rationale behind this con-
clusion rests in the analysis that debt arises out of contract, while
the father's obligation is more elemental than that upon which a
contract is based.
Similarly the North Dakota Supreme Court held72 that in
bastardy cases there could be no imprisonment for debt because
the state's only purpose in imprisoning the father is to force him
to perform his moral obligation. Furthermore, a defendant con-
victed of bastardy suffers imprisonment in most cases only if he
fails to obey the support order.73 This procedure is generally
known as civil contempt, e.g., the failure to obey a court order
in an action for specific performance. 74
One of the most informative examples of constitutional ob-
jections raised in paternity actions is the privilege against self-
incrimination. This question was probed in depth by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in People v. Stoeckl,75 a case involving the
prohibition against a prosecutor's comment upon the defendant's
failure to testify.
The majority opinion relied heavily upon People v. Martin76
which held 77 that the right to waive a jury trial in criminal cases
is likewise available in bastardy cases. The court in Martin be-
lieved that juries in bastardy cases are likely to be swayed by
emotions and sympathies so as to overlook the important testi-
mony bearing upon the main issue, i.e., the paternity of the defend-
ant. The Martin case thus construed the statute78 providing this
right to waive a jury trial in "criminal cases" so that "quasi crim-
inal cases" were included within the term "criminal cases".
Following these views the court in Stoeckl concluded: 79
If bastardy proceedings are criminal to that point where the
statutory provisions in regard to the right to waive a jury in
criminal casez prevail, then the proceedings should be criminal
to that point where the prohibition against commentary on de-
fendant's failure to testify should apply.
7' Ibid.
72 State v. Hollinger, 69 N.D. 363, 287 N.W. 225 (1939).
73 State v. Jeffry, 188 Minn. 476, 247 N.W. 692 (1933).
74 See Id.
75 347 Mich. 1, 78 N.W.2d 640 (1956).
76 256 Mich. 33, 239 N.W. 341 (1931).
77 Ibid.
78 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 763.3 (1948).
79 People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich. 1, 17, 78 N.W.2d 640, 643 (1956).
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[The dissent] on this question could be accepted if this Court
would adopt the principle that once the criminal procedural phases
of bastardy, such as warrant, bail, et cetera, have served their
purpose and the trial commenced, then all criminal aspects dis-
appear and the case should be tried as civil in its nature.
The dissent, however, did not advocate the abandonment of all
criminal aspects of bastardy after the initial procedural phases: °
And so it is, for reasons having to do with the purpose of the
action that we hold a questioned civil (or criminal) procedure
to be applicable, or inapplicable, as the various cases come before
us. Our ruling thereon does not mean that thereafter, in all
respects, the bastardy action will be deemed either purely civil
(or criminal). Thus we held in In re Cannon . . . that extradi-
tion could not be had; thus, for such purpose, emphasizing the
civil aspect. Yet we very properly held in Cady v. St. Clair
Circuit Judge ... that the defendant could be arrested and jailed
even when he would be entitled to immunity from service in a
civil action. Likewise we held in People v. Martin . . . that ...
the defendant might waive a jury as may the defendant in a
criminal case. But we did not thereby hold that the action was
thereafter to be deemed "criminal," to the extent that the prosecu-
tion could not comment on the defendant's failure to testify, any-
more than we held that it became "civil" following In re Cannon's
case, supra, to the extent that the defendant would have the same
immunity from service as a defendant in a civil action.
The majority, therefore, seeks stability in the law of paternity.
Procedural problems would be solved by giving the defendant the
protections of the criminal law in all cases. In this way alleged
fathers always could be certain of what rights were available
to them. The dissent, however, espouses virtually an ad hoc ap-
proach. Almost painfully analytical, the dissent probes the rea-
sons back of a procedure and evaluates its applicability to the
defendant at bar. Where there is no good purpose to be served
in employing the processes of the criminal law, the dissent would
not employ them.
Following this method the dissent s ' stated that there was no
cause to protect the policy behind the privilege against self-
incrimination in bastardy cases and, therefore, no cause to pro-
scribe inferences arising from the claim of such privilege. The
dissent viewed the privilege as necessary only where the state is
likely to require evidence from the defendant and where the evi-
dence otherwise might not be available as is the complaining
mother's testimony in a paternity proceeding. In such case the
privilege deters the application of official force to extract the
80 Id. at 11, 78 N.W.2d at 648 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
8' Id. (dissenting opinion).
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evidence. Moreover, the dissent acknowledged that the proscrip-
tion against inferences would guard against indirect compulsion
to surrender the privilege in such cases.
However, it should be noted that the desire for evidence is
not the only reason why official authority would coerce a de-
fendant. Absent the privilege against compulsory self-disclosure
the police authorities would be tempted to coerce a confession
even if other evidence were available. There is minor difference
between the defendant accused of bastardy and one accused of
statutory rape. Both defendants face the accusation of a woman
who, presumably, can supply the evidence necessary for a con-
viction. Yet it cannot be argued that the statutory rape defendant
needs no protection against a forced confession.
Examination of the dissent's arguments, therefore, points up
the need for a simpler and more uniform treatment of de-
fendants accused of illicit paternity. The majority opinion sug-
gests a workable solution by giving the defendant all of the pro-
cedural benefits of the criminal law without the often misleading
dissection of the civil and criminal elements inextricably mixed
in bastardy proceedings.
VI. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
State v. Sax,8 2 a Minnesota case, decided that, although the
state originally instituted the action, the mother in a paternity
proceeding has sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to
bring an appeal from a support order. The court said that the
legislature, by making the state a party to the action, evinced a
clear intent that the mother should have every opportunity to
impose upon the father his proper responsibility even to the ex-
tent of an appeal in her own name. The court said further that
other states usually confer the right of appeal upon the mother.
The dissent countered with the observation that there can be
no jurisdiction for an appeal by the mother where there is no cor-
responding statutory authorization. The dissent amplified by stat-
ing that only parties of record are entitled to an appeal and that
the statute should be strictly construed because it is in derogation
of common law. Finally the dissent argued that the majority er-
roneously invoked the decisions of other jurisdictions in determin-
ing the right of appeal:8 3
Without reference to the statutes of the state involved, it is
difficult to apply decisions of foreign courts in the construction
82 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680 (1950).
83 Id. at 26, 42 N.W.2d at 694 (dissenting opinion).
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of our own statutes. Furthermore, it is almost entirely a matter
of determining what the intention of our legislature was in enact-
ing the statutes which we now have.
Nowhere does the majority or dissenting opinion discuss the
good or bad effects on mother or father if an appeal is awarded.
One bad effect on the father is the possibility that the support
order will be doubled; that he will be paying $30 per week instead
of $15 per week for 16 years to support his child. One good effect
on the mother is the possibility that newly discovered evidence will
reveal hidden resources of the irresponsible father and enable the
mother to care for the child more adequately. Whether an appeal
is awarded is not of greatest importance. Of ultimate importance
is the awareness that a human problem is involved: the support
of an unwelcome infant to adulthood. This awareness is not gen-
erated by the use of such judicial clich6s as "legislative intent,"
"statutory analogy," "strict construction" or "derogation of com-
mon law." This awareness is generated by an analysis of the grave
consequences resulting from a paternity determination and an ex-
amination of the distinctions between civil damages and a bastardy
support order. The defendant father paying a support order is
similar to the civil damages defendant with one exception: he
is also subjected to the scorn of the community for not marrying
the mother of his child. This community attitude toward the de-
fendant is demonstrated by a long list of cases where innocent
men accused of bastardy have preferred extortion to notoriety.8 4
Yet perhaps this disgrace remains the same regardless of what
amount the court may award for support of the child. In this
connecton, an appeal by the mother in the Sax case does not place
the father "twice in jeopardy" of suffering this disgrace. As a re-
sult the criminal overtones of a bastardy proceeding are muted in
the fact that the mother's appeal does not expose the defendant to
any risk against which the criminal law traditionally has afforded
protection.
The method of deciding the applicability of double jeopardy
protection in filiation actions is, for the most part, uniform among
the states. Thus in Maryland where the action is criminal the
protection is guaranteed.8 5 Similarly, in West Virginia where
84 See Schatkir*, The Scandal of Our Paternity Courts, Reader's Digest,
May 1960, p. 71 (passim).
85 See Lank v. State, 219 Md. 433, 436, 149 A.2d 367, 368 (App. 1959):
Since a prosecution for bastardy, although civil in purpose,
is a criminal proceeding in Maryland it is subject to the same
constitutional guarantees as affect and control the trial of other
criminal cases.
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bastardy is civil, double jeopardy protection is denied.8 6 Some-
times, however, the court attempts subtlety and arrives at its
decision by invoking the will of the legislature. Thus in Delaware
the Supreme Court reasoned8 7 that, since paternity actions were
created by statute, they are totally regulated by statute. There-
fore, if no right of appeal by the state is designated in the statute,
the right is nonexistent. A like conclusion was reached in Ore-
gon8s where the court said:8 9 "The right of appeal given by the
statute is, by express terms, restricted to the defendant." How-
ever, the statute actually provided that "The defendant shall be
entitled to the right of trial by jury, and appeal, as provided in
civil actions." 90
The decisions dealing with appeals up to this point disclose
limited thought. This limitation is not universal in the courts
and a Kentucky decision, White v. Commonwealth,91 suspended
a rule of civil procedure even though Kentucky bastardy statutes
are fully civil. The rule involved required the alleged father
desiring an appeal to post a bond sufficient to satisfy the poten-
tial liability of the judgment rendered upon appeal. Since the de-
fendant was ordered to support his bastard child for 18 years the
potential liability amounted to $9,000. The court held92 that even
if the defendant was not a pauper (which he was) there was an
obvious difficulty or impossibility of obtaining a bond for such
a substantial amount over a long period of time. The rule re-
quiring the bond was not applied to bastardy proceedings despite
the clear indication which the traffic in labels would have pro-
duced. This kind of thinking is not impossible, merely infrequent.
VII. THE NEW YORK PROBLEM
New York is singled out here for examination because its
paternity proceedings epitomize the incapacity displayed by both
courts and legislatures to handle intelligently the problems of
paternity. In upper New York State bastardy proceedings are
8G State v. Easley, 129 W.Va. 410, 40 S.E.2d 827 (1946).
S7 State ex rel. Johnson v. Wright, 39 Del. 552, 3 A.2d 74 (1938).
88 State ex rel. Borland v. Yates, 104 Ore. 667, 209 Pac. 231 (1922).
89 Id. at 670, 209 Pac. at 232.
90 Ore. Laws c. 48, §§ 2550-63 (1917).
91 299 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. App. 1957).
92 Ibid.
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civil, while in New York City they are criminal.9 3 Furthermore,
even in New York City the courts still are hesitant whether civil
or criminal procedure prevails in filiation actions.94
New York, moreover, refocuses the old inquiry into the egg-
chicken dilemma of which came first. This inquiry (cast into
93 See People v. Bowers, 9 Misc.2d 873, 170 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Child. Ct.
Broome Co. 1958). The court said at 876-77, 170 N.Y.S.2d 550-51:
Formerly filiation proceedings were held to be of a quasi
criminal nature and the right to appeal was governed by the
sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure ....
In 1925 the law governing filiation proceedings was set
forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but in that year a
new law was enacted which became Article 8 of the Domestic
Relations Law of the State of New York. Section 122 of the
Domestic Relations Law states, "For the purpose of this article
jurisdiction is conferred upon the children's court in the
counties where such courts have been established under the
children's court act of the state of New York; . . . and the
courts heretofore exercising jurisdiction in bastardy cases of
the city of New York."
Section 139 of the Domestic Relations Law states, "All
provisions of the penal law or code of criminal procedure or
other statutes inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions
of this article shall be considered as inapplicable to the cases
arising under this article."
By special act certain counties of the State had established
Children's Courts, but the general act establishing Children's
Courts in each county of upstate New York became effective
in 1924. Section 6 of the Children's Court Act, Sub-division 3,
states, "The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
in the hearing and determination of the cases of children born
out of wedlock in accordance with the provisions of article
eight of the domestic relations law."
Section 45 of the Children's Court Act states, "All provi-
sions of the penal law or code of criminal procedure or other
statutes inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provi-
sions of the act shall be considered inapplicable to cases aris-
ing under this act."
It is clear that a filiation proceeding in upstate New York
is a civil proceeding and in New York City is treated as crim-
inal in nature, depending upon the court in which the pro-
ceeding is initiated. ...
Cases arising in the City of New York are still held to
be bound by sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
94 See, e.g., Hodson ex rel. Hoff v. Hoff, 266 App.Div. 228, 42 N.Y.S.2d 1
(Sup.Ct.) aff'd 291 N.Y. 518, 50 N.E.2d 648 (1943) ("A paternity pro-
ceeding is essentially 'civil' in nature, although partly 'criminal' in
form"); Fowler v. Rizzuto, 205 Misc. 1088, 132 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Ct.Spec.
Sess.N.Y. Co. 1954) ("A supplementary proceeding examination is a
purely civil remedy and is not available in a paternity action").
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the reference of the present subject) normally asks first what
procedure should be used in paternity cases and then determines
the corresponding tribunal for trial under the procedure selected.
New York, however, as might be guessed, has reversed the se-
quence of this inquiry so that, depending on the court assigned
jurisdiction over the action in question, the procedure customary
to the court is applicable to the action:95
A filiation proceeding initiated ... in a children's court, pur-
suant to the Domestic Relations Law, is civil and non-criminal in
nature. Confirmation is furnished by the definition of a "crime"
as well as by the inherent character of a criminal prosecution
.... Although we have held that a paternity suit is criminal in
form . . . it must be observed, that such statements were made,
such rulings announced, in cases brought in the Court of Special
Sessions of the City of New York under the ... New York City
Criminal Courts Act . . . and were regulated by the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Civil in essence, the proceeding assumes a
"criminal" form from its suroundings-from the fact that it is
tried in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
Under this disposition nothing has been solved; rather, the
question becomes what court instead of what procedure for pa-
ternity. The more significant question is: why, within one state,
should bastardy be criminal in one city and civil in all other cities?
Why should the defendant's rights be determined by the geograph-
ical accident of the city in which the proceeding is instituted?
An analysis of the statutes pertaining to the New York City
courts reveals the legislative turmoil occasioned by filiation actions.
As an example, the double jeopardy problem is useful because new
trials generally are available in criminal cases only to defendants. 9 6
Accordingly, section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure97 gives
the right to move for a new trial to defendant only. Yet section
78 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act9" repeals all pro-
visions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with the
City Act's provisions dealing with paternity proceedings. 99 In
addition, section 76100 of the City Act allows an appeal, as of right,
to a complainant as well as to a defendant in a filiation proceeding.
95 In re Clausi, 296 N.Y. 354, 355-56, 73 N.E.2d 548, 549 (1947).
96 See MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 273 (1959).
97 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 465.
9S N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT. § 78. This act will be referred to as the
City Act.
99 The City Act's provisions dealing with paternity are found in N.Y.C.
CRIM. CTS. ACT art. V.
100 N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 76.
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On the other hand, section 31101 of the New York City Criminal
Courts Act (which sets forth the jurisdiction of the Court of
Special Sessions) is silent on the power to grant a new trial to
other than a defendant. Also, while section 76102 of this act au-
thorizes an appeal by the complainant in a filiation case, it is
silent on the subject of a motion for a new trial by the complain-
ant. Nevertheless, it has been held'0 3 that a claim of double
jeopardy in a bastardy case cannot prevent a new trial in the
city courts. In that event, since the appeal mechanism is avail-
able and sufficient to achieve a new trial, there is no reason why
a new trial should not be available on motion also. A New York
decision reached the same conclusion, 10 4 but not without three
separate opinions reflecting the statutory tangle in that state.
That decision, furthermore, was not insensitive to the special
problem surrounding a paternity defendant: 105
This standard [of proof] is not that in civil actions where a
mere preponderance of the credible evidence is sufficient. Nor
is the standard as rigorous as that in criminal actions, where
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is demanded. The
evidence in an affiliation case must be entirely satisfactory. An
order of filiation will not be granted unless the complainant sus-
tains the burden of proof "which goes beyond a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence to the point of entire satisfaction."...
The evidence of defendant's paternity must be clear and convinc-
ing .... If the evidence adduced in behalf of the complainant
fails to measure up to that standard, the complainant will be dis-
missed.
Paternity in New York City cannot be readily classified even
though the action is brought in the criminal courts.10 In Duerr
v. Wittmann'07 the New York Supreme Court was required to
101 N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 31.
102 See note 100 supra.
103 See Hodson ex tel. Hoff v. Hoff, 266 App. Div. 228, 42 N.Y.S.2d 1
(Sup.Ct.), aff'd 291 N.Y. 518, 50 N.E.2d 648 (1943).
104 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 13 Misc.2d 718, 180 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Ct.Spec.
Sess. N.Y. Co. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Dep't of Pub. Welfare ex rel.
Morgan v. Jarcho, 7 App.Div.2d 979, 184 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't. 1959)
(mem.).
105 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 13 Misc.2d 718, 725, 180 N.Y.S.2d 183, 187
(Ct.Spec.Sess. N.Y. Co. 1958), affd sub nom., Dep't. of Pub. Welfare
ex rel. Morgan v. Jarcho, 7 App.Div.2d 979, 184 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st
Dep't. 1959) (mem.).
106 See Duerr v. Wittmann, 5 App.Div.2d 326, 171 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1st Dep't.
1958).
107 Ibid.
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decide whether a paternity case was instituted within the period
of the statute of limitations. Specifically the problem involved
both a warrant and a summons which, under the act in question,
a judge may issue at his discretion. 108 In the Duerr case the
trial court initially issued a summons when the mother filed her
complaint. Because the summons could not be served the court
then issued a warrant for the defendant's arrest. The summons was
within, and the warrant was outside the statutory period limiting
filiation actions. The lower court had reasoned that bastardy is
criminal, criminal actions commence with a warrant,10 9 and the
warrant was issued beyond the statutory period.
The New York Supreme Court rejected on two grounds the
conclusion that bastardy is criminal:
1. Crime implies punishment and in bastardy actions there
is no punishment.
2. Procedural rules peculiar to criminal cases are held inap-
plicable to paternity cases. (No requirement for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt;110 corroboration of mother's
testimony unnecessary;." judgment may be rendered in
the absence of defendant.)112
However, the court continued:
Nor can the paternity proceeding properly be deemed a civil
action .... While it is in a sense a dispute between private liti-
gants for the enforcement of rights and the prevention of wrongs
with regard to obligations of financial support it is a dispute in
which the state has an interest, in which it may participate on
behalf of the mother, and in which the machinery of the criminal
courts is invoked. In fact, it was not until comparatively recently
that private parties as well as governmental bodies were given
the right to initiate a paternity proceeding .... [U]nlike the
private litigant in a common law action, [the mother] must bring
her suit in a criminal court by presenting her complaint to the
court, in much the same way as an information is presented in
a criminal proceeding. A warrant of arrest can be issued for the
defendant forthwith, evidence of good character is admissible and
confessions and admissions must be corroborated by other proof.
The conclusion was inescapable: bastardy actions are sui ge-
neris-neither civil nor criminal rules apply. Therefore, the court
"Is N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 64.
100 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 144.
110 Commissioner v. Ryan, 238 App.Div. 607, 265 N.Y.Supp. 286 (1st
Dep't. 1933).
11 Commissioner v. Vassie, 167 App.Div. 74, 152 N.Y.Supp. 496 (2d Dep't.
1915).
112 N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 67.
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looked to the statute which stated that the "proceeding is brought
by the mother."113 The court held that a "proceeding" can be
"brought" only through the instrumentality of the complaint and
that, therefore, the time of filing the complaint was critical in
determining whether the action was brought within the statute
of limitations. Since the complaint was filed at the same time
that the summons was issued, the statute did not bar the action.
The clear fact remains, however, that the act does not pur-
port to establish the time at which a paternity case is instituted
in New York City. The statute to which the court referred
merely sets forth one of the parties who can institute the pro-
ceeding, i.e., the mother. This case illustrates the problem of
statutory silence on the subject of bastardy procedure coupled
with occasional judicial reluctance to apply either criminal or civil
rules to fill the void. At a deeper level the problem is the courts'
lack of understanding of a social status: illicit fatherhood. Re-
cour.re by the courts to statutory crystal-gazing in order to answer
a question never in the cognizance of the legislature is a poor
substitute for an investigation of the reasons why a putative
father may need certain protections which the courts have a duty
to provide.
VIII. ANATOMY OF LABELS
We have followed alleged fathers, convicted fathers, husband-
less mothers, bastards and the courts through the wonderland of
paternity proceedings from their institution to their appeal. At
this point, it is submitted, a brief examination of the formulas
and ingredients frequently used by the courts in deciding bastardy
cases may point up "the better way" to solve the paternity problem.
This "better way" implies that the jurisprudence of labels is
unacceptable as too mechanical and too unthinking an approach.
The suggestion is, therefore, that a test can be devised which
identifies the meaningful criminal (or civil) elements of bastardy
so that jurisprudence by the labels "criminal" or "civil" may
implement reflective conduct by judges. There is nothing wrong
with labels if they accurately represent their classification. We
can either discard labels or make the labels meaningful. There
is no difference between these alternatives.
In Vermont both the purpose and the procedure involved in
bastardy proceedings were the elements which were identified
in labeling the action "civil". 114
113 N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 64.
114 Bielowski v. Burke, 121 Vt. 62, 147 A.2d 674, 676 (1959).
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The object of the proceeding is not for punishment. It is to
ascertain the father and compel him to contribute to the support
of the child if he is adjudged to be the father. The whole pro-
ceedings cease [sic] if the woman dies or is married before the
child is born or should miscarry. All this shows that it is a civil
suit and subject to amendment like other civil suits.
In South Carolina the court looked to: (1) the tribunal which
was vested with bastardy jurisdiction, and (2) certain statutory
uses of words, in order to determine the correct label.115
[Because] our statutes . .. expressly require that this issue in
[bastardy] cases shall be tried in the [criminal] court, it would
seem to be conclusive that the legislature intended to make the
offense of bastardy a criminal offense; . . . and the use of the
words "accused", "acquitted", and "convicted"... points to the
same conclusion.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has noted11 6 that bastardy pro-
ceedings were never embodied in any of the codes of civil and
criminal procedure in that state and traditionally operated under
a procedure of its own. The court then announced with contented
illogic: 117
We, therefore, look to the law relating to civil actions for
procedure only on such points or questions where the bastardy act
itself is silent, or for which it makes no provision.
How bastardy proceedings admittedly set off alone and apart
from civil or criminal procedures ultimately can be identified with
civil procedure remains unexplainable. Even more unexplainable
is the fact that the bastardy act, as compiled in the 1923 revision
of all Kansas statutes, was given a place under the classification
of criminal procedure."I s
Another formula was suggested when the Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed a decision requiring the defendant to give notice
of his intent to use an alibi as prescribed by a criminal statute:1 19
In the cases cited it is patent that the statutory provisions
relating to criminal cases were applied in each instance for the
benefit and protection of the defendant. The situation is in prac-
tical effect that one against whom a proceeding is instituted un-
der the statutory provisions applicable to a case of this nature may
invoke the protection afforded in matters of procedure to one on
115 State v. Brewer, 38 S.C. 263, 16 S.E. 1001 (1893).
116 State v. Pinkerton, 185 Kan. 68, 340 P.2d 393 (1959).
117 Id. 340 P.2d at 394.
11s KAN. REV. STAT. c. 21, § 442 (1923). The present statute is KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2303 (1949).
11 People v. McFadden, 347 Mich. 357, 362, 79 N.W.2d 869, 871-72 (1956).
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trial for a criminal offense. If the defendant is entitled to such
right, the conclusion logically follows that he may not avoid
compliance with a requirement, imposed by statute with reference
to such procedure, prescribed, not for the benefit of the defend-
ant but for the benefit and protection of the public. The trial
judge in the instant case was not in error in denying defendant
the right to introduce testimony for the purpose of establishing
an alibi on the ground that notice of such defense had not been
given to the people.
The concurring opinion by Justice Smith120 rejected the
"theory of epithetical jurisprudence, that anything was solved
by calling this action 'civil' or 'criminal'." Justice Smith sug-
gested 121 rather that the court in each instance "must look to the
purpose to be served by the statute under consideration and equate
such purpose against the intendment of the bastardy act." Justice
Smith, furthermore, argued that bastardy held criminal for one
purpose need not be so for another. Also, because the defendant
had the protection of certain statutes is no reason, in Justice
Smith's mind, why the defendant should be required to comply
with other statutes prescribed "not for the benefit of the defend-
ant but for the benefit and protection of the public."
Justice Smith continued: 1
22
It is impossible thus to classify statutory safeguards and re-
quirements, particularly those relating to trials and procedures
in causes criminal in nature, saying this one is for the benefit of
the defendant, that one for the benefit of the public. Is not, in
truth, the public welfare equally on trial with the prisoner in the
dock? Do we not degrade our society as well as him if we deny
him due process? What, indeed, is to his benefit that is not to
ours, what goes to his protection that protects not us? . . . To
me the distinction made is verbal only, not of substance. It is
completely unworkable -as a matter of practice and can serve only
to further confuse a situation already badly muddled.
Notice of alibi should be given, however, because this action
is peculiarly susceptible to the evil sought to be cured through the
adoption of such statute.
A formula similar to the one denounced by Justice Smith was
explained in the District of Columbia.1 23 Under this formula only
criminal procedures should be applied to bastardy cases when
the procedure in question is relevant not to the child but to the
defendant alone. The decision further explained' 24 that "while the
120 Id. at 363, 79 N.W.2d at 872 (concurring opinion).
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 District of Columbia v. Turner, 154 A.2d 925 (D.C. Mun. App. 1959).
124 Ibid.
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court may sympathize with the parents, it is concerned with the
infant."
Applying this formula the court held 12 5 that the defendant
could be convicted merely by a preponderance of the evidence
and without corroboration of the mother's testimony. It could
be contended that questions dealing with burden of proof and
corroboration are relevant "not to the child but to the defendant
alone." Yet civil not criminal procedure was applied to this defend-
ant. Doubtless these holdings evinced more "concern for the infant
than sympathy for the parent."
As a contrast to jurisdictions requiring formulas and labels
to solve problems raised in paternity cases, Maryland has a statute
which without equivocation establishes bastardy as an entirely
criminal offense.' 26  Yet it was held' 27 that the statute is dis-
tinctly in the interest of the mother, and she is the beneficiary
of the statute. As a result the court decided 28 that a contract by a
putative father to provide for an illegitimate's support upon the
condition that bastardy proceedings will not be instituted is not
a contract to compound a criminal prosecution. By this decision
the court has weakened the effectiveness of a crisp legislative
determination calling for a criminal disposition of all questions
raised in paternity cases.
IX. CONCLUSION
The difference between civil law and criminal law turns on
the difference between two different objects which the law seeks
to pursue-edress or punishment.129
In bastardy the law seeks redress, while punishment is im-
posed by the social stigma of a conviction. Even if there are civil
elements to the action, nevertheless, it is more fitting that our
system of justice give a defendant criminal protection rather than
deprive him of some of the rights to which he is entitled. In ad-
dition, it is more practical that the defendant enjoy criminal pro-
tection absent an uncertain and often unreasoned determination
in each case as to whether the "civil" or "criminal" tags apply.
In this way all parties to paternity suits will know exactly what
125 Ibid.
126 MD. ANN. CODE art. 12, § 8 (1957).
127 Fiege v. Boehrm, 210 Md. 352, 123 A.2d 316 (App. 1956).
128 Ibid.
129 GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW 8-9 (1911).
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rules govern in every case. If the mother, under this plan, has
too much difficulty securing the father's support of the child,
let the taxpayers provide for the young wards of the state. The
public risks merely the loss of its dollars, but the defendant con-
victed of bastardy suffers an inestimable loss including his repu-
tation and self-respect. The conflict thus presented permits but
one decision.
